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INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	EB-01
	OIGO-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01
	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/040W	
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P 130148Z MAY 95  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4930  
INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JOINT STAFF WASHDC  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001951

YOUNDE FOR DATT;  
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC;  
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, J5, J3, JS; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:5/31/00  
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PHUM, PREF, UNSC  
SUBJECT: ADJUSTING UNAMIR'S MANDATE

REF: (A) KIGALI 1493 (B) USUN 1872 (C) STATE 105037  
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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: MISSION AGREES WITH GENERAL THRUST OF THINKING BY WASHINGTON, UN HQ, SRSG AND FORCE COMMANDER FAVORING REDUCTION OF UNAMIR MILITARY CONTINGENT AND REDIRECTION OF TASKS. UNAMIR'S MODEST CAPACITY TO AID NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE BY LESS NEAR TERM EMPHASIS ON SECURITY FOR REPATRIATION AND MORE ON A CIVIL SECURITY PRESENCE TO SMOOTH THE RE-ABSORPTION OF RWANDA'S HUTU POPULATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. MUCH OF THE LATTER DEPENDS ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE PEACEKEEPING. BUT UNAMIR CAN BE A KEY INGREDIENT AS CATALYST FOR THE CIVIL SECURITY NECESSARY FOR RECONCILIATION BY USE OF MILITARY OBSERVERS IN THE COMMUNES, CIVPOL TRAINERS AND MONITORS, AND POSSIBLY BORDER MONITORS. WE NOTE TUTSI HARDLINER VIEWS DESCRIBED REFTEL BUT BELIEVE THESE MAY NOT PREVAIL WITH KAGAME/BIZIMUNGU ESPECIALLY IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WESTERN DONORS HOLD FIRM. END SUMMARY.

3. IN RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT REQUEST FOR VIEWS (REF C), USUN BELIEVES UNAMIR'S MAIN CONTRIBUTION TO RWANDAN RECONCILIATION SHOULD BE TO AUGMENT THAT COUNTRY'S CAPACITY TO SAFELY RE-ABSORB ITS MODERATE HUTU POPULATION RATHER THAN TO ASSIST LARGE-SCALE REPATRIATION OVER THE SHORT-TERM. RECENT EVENTS IN RWANDA REVEAL STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES TO REPATRIATION NOT EASILY REMOVED. THEY INCLUDE A MINORITY GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CREDIBLE HUTU PARTICIPATION, PRESSURES FROM TUTSI HARDLINERS OPPOSED TO IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA  
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ACCORDS, A CLIMATE OF INSECURITY IN KIGALI AND MANY OUTLYING AREAS, WIDESPREAD SUSPICIONS OF - AND FREQUENT REPRISALS AGAINST - RETURNEES, AND SLOW OR NO JUDICIAL ACTION AGAINST GENOCIDE SUSPECTS DUE TO WEAK OR NON-EXISTENT JUDICIAL AND PENAL INSTITUTIONS. ABSENT FORCIBLE ACTION BY HOST GOVERNMENTS - POSSIBLE IN TANZANIA AND UGANDA, LESS LIKELY FOR ZAIRE (DESPITE RECENT NOISES) WHERE MOST REFUGEES ARE - THESE CONDITIONS WILL DISCOURAGE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION. UNTIL THINGS CHANGE, SECURITY FOR REFUGEE RETURN SHOULD

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NOT BE A PRIMARY MISSION TASK OR FORCE DETERMINANT.

4. NEITHER SHOULD UNAMIR HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS OR DISPLACED PERSONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (GOR) HAS CONSOLIDATED ITS CONTROL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. ITS SENSITIVITY ABOUT INFRINGEMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS INCREASINGLY XENOPHOBIC MINDSET HAS ALREADY LED TO NASTY INCIDENTS. THIS WILL CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE UNAMIR'S EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A MORE ACTIVE PRESENCE, ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT LESSEN ITS IMPORTANCE. HOWEVER, DIRECT SECURITY TASKS ARE NOT FEASIBLE. INDEED, THE INABILITY OF THE ZAMBIAN COMPANY TO PREVENT THE KIBEHO TRAGEDY ARGUES FORCEFULLY AGAINST MAKING UNAMIR RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY UNLESS IT IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING IT. SINCE THIS IS NOT IN THE CARDS, IT SHOULD NOT BE IN THE MANDATE.

5. WHILE IT IS THE MOST VISIBLE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN RWANDA, AND THE MOST EXPENSIVE, UNAMIR'S DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO A DURABLE PEACE IS LIMITED. MOVEMENT TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WILL REQUIRE

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PARTICIPATION BY GENUINE HUTU LEADERS IN BIZIMUNGU'S GOVERNMENT; CLEAR GOR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW AND ORDER AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND THE CAPACITY TO DELIVER ON IT; EVIDENCE THAT PERPETRATORS OF GENOCIDE ARE BEING FAIRLY PUNISHED; AND ECONOMIC AID TO SMOOTH REINTEGRATION OF RETURNING HUTUS. THE KEY TO ALL OF THIS IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE INNER CIRCLE OF THE GOR AND RPA LEADERSHIP, WHERE SRSG KHAN'S GOOD OFFICES ARE CRITICAL AS IS AID AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY. UNAMIR COULD ALSO EXERCISE GOOD OFFICES REGIONALLY, IN ORDER TO INCORPORATE REFUGEE AND OTHER EXPATRIOT ELEMENTS INTO THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS AND TO DEAL MORE SYSTEMATICALLY WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

6. ALTHOUGH UNAMIR'S ROLE IS RESIDUAL IT IS STILL SIGNIFICANT. FIRST, IT SHOULD BE A CATALYST FOR THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY. KHAN AND TOUSIGNANT'S PROPOSAL (REF B) FOR A VISIBLE UNAMIR PRESENCE IN THE

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143 VILLAGES OR "COMMUNES" IS WELCOME. SINCE MOST  
VILLAGES NOW LACK THEIR OWN POLICE OR GENDARMES, A  
FREQUENT UNAMIR PRESENCE IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES COULD GO A

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E.O.12356: DECL:5/31/00  
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PHUM, PREF, UNSC  
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LONG WAY TO INHIBIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IF THE UN  
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PERSONNEL INVOLVED ACT APPROPRIATELY TO HEAD OFF OR  
DETER INCIDENTS. THIS ALSO HAS THE VIRTUE OF DIRECTING  
MOST OF UNAMIR'S RESOURCES TOWARD RESTORING SECURE  
CONDITIONS IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES, WITHOUT WHICH  
SIGNIFICANT REPATRIATION WILL NOT TAKE PLACE. THE  
DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL HOWEVER ARE UNCLEAR SINCE IT  
CALLS FOR BOTH UNAMIR INFANTRY AND MILITARY OBSERVERS TO  
VISIT COMMUNES AND DOES NOT SUGGEST HOW THESE VISITS  
WOULD DIFFER IN FUNCTION, OR HOW THEY WOULD BE  
COORDINATED WITH EACH OTHER, OR WITH THE PRESENCE OF  
HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD MONITORS (ALL OF WHOM ALSO HAVE 2  
ARMED UNAMIR ESCORTS) AND FREQUENT VISITS BY THE RPA.  
BUT CLEARLY THE MORE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE THE BETTER.  
IN THIS REGARD, THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR TROOPS  
AS ESCORTS FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
TRIBUNAL AND PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IS ALSO POSITIVE.

7. INTENSIFIED UNAMIR ASSISTANCE IN ESTABLISHING A  
PROFESSIONAL POLICE FORCE WILL BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT  
OVER THE LONG TERM THAN ITS COMMUNAL PATROLING.  
UNFORTUNATELY, ONLY ABOUT HALF THE AUTHORIZED COMPLEMENT  
OF CIVILIAN POLICE TRAINERS IS DEPLOYED AND THE POLICE  
TRAINING PROGRAM IS WELL BEHIND SCHEDULE. A US EFFORT  
TO ENCOURAGE GREATER DONOR SUPPORT FOR UNAMIR CIVILIAN  
POLICE SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE  
MANDATE RENEWAL.

8. SRSG KHAN ALSO WANTS UNAMIR TASKED WITH MONITORING  
RWANDA'S BORDERS. THIS WARRANTS CONSIDERATION. THE  
REQUIREMENT IN TERMS OF REFUGEE FLOW IS PROBABLY MINIMAL

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SINCE UNHCR AND OTHER RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS ALREADY WATCH  
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THIS CLOSELY. BUT UNAMIR MONITORS MAY BE A MEANS OF  
SPOTLIGHTING CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT BY THE FORMER RWANDAN  
ARMY AND, BY EXTENSION, OF INHIBITING ZAIRE FROM  
ASSISTING IN THAT. THE PROPOSAL CALLS FOR PATROLS BY  
CHOPPER, BOAT, AND STATIONARY TEAMS AT THE 15 CROSSING  
POINTS. WE MIGHT WANT A MORE DETAILED PICTURE OF THE  
TERRAIN AND JUNGLE CANOPY CONDITIONS BEFORE CONSIDERING  
CHOPPERS. AND OF COURSE UNAMIR'S IMPARTIALITY WOULD  
PROHIBIT ANY JOINT MONITORING.

9. MORE BROADLY, UNAMIR MONITORS WOULD SIGNAL KIGALI  
THAT WHILE THE UN SUPPORTS REINTEGRATION OF EXPATRIOT  
HUTUS, IT OPPOSES MILITARY INCURSIONS BY THE LATTER.  
THE MORE THE GOR TRUSTS THE UN THE MORE IT MAY BE  
WILLING TO PERMIT THE RATHER INTRUSIVE PRESENCE IN THE  
COMMUNES DESCRIBED IN PARA 6. ALTHOUGH TUTSI HARDLINERS  
(REF A) NOW SAY THEY WILL ONLY ACCEPT UNAMIR ON THE  
ZAIRIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER AND AROUND THE REFUGEE CAMPS,  
THIS SOUNDS LIKE A MAXIMALIST TACTIC, NOT A FINAL WORD  
ON THE BORDER MONITOR IDEA.

10. THE UN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS (DPA)  
INFORMED USUN MAY 11 THAT THE GOR HAD VOICED VIEWS ON  
THE NEW MANDATE THAT WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE DESCRIBED REF  
A. SPECIFICALLY: THE GOR IS ONLY WILLING TO SEE UNAMIR  
ACCOMPANY AND PROTECT TRIBUNAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORKERS,  
PROTECT ITS OWN PREMISES AND HELP REBUILD RWANDA'S  
INFRASTRUCTURE. ANY BORDER MONITORING WOULD HAVE TO BE  
ON THE ZAIRE SIDE EXCLUSIVELY. UNAMIR SHOULD TERMINATE  
ITS POLICE TRAINING COMPONENT, WHILE THE GOR MAKES  
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLICE TRAINING. THEY DO NOT  
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WANT INFANTRY APART FROM THAT NEEDED TO PROTECT UNAMIR  
PREMISES. DPA PASSED ON THE INFORMATION THAT UNAMIR HAS  
SET UP A BRANCH OFFICE IN KINSHASA, STAFFED WITH A  
POLITICAL ADVISER.

11. DPA ALSO REPORTS THAT SRSG KHAN PERSONALLY FAVORS  
ADDING AN INFRASTRUCTURE-REBUILDING ROLE FOR UNAMIR BUT  
THAT HEADQUARTERS IS LUKEWARM (COMMENT: AS WE ARE).  
THEY ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING  
OPERATIONS (DPKO), AND ESPECIALLY MILITARY ADVISER  
GENERAL BARIL, WOULD RATHER SHUT UNAMIR DOWN THEN SEE IT  
TRUNCATED AS THE GOR IS SUGGESTING.12. COMMENT: IN  
MISSION'S VIEW THE GOR'S TERRITORIAL CONTROL REQUIRES  
CHANGES IN UNAMIR'S TASKS AND APPROACH, NOT ITS GOAL.  
THE LATTER REMAINS TO SUPPORT RECONCILIATION WHILE  
SEEKING WAYS TO FORESTALL THE RETURN OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE  
AND WITH IT THE RISK OF A RENEWED CIVIL WAR WHICH COULD  
ENGULF THE REGION. IF UNAMIR IS NOT CONTRIBUTING TO  
THAT GOAL IT SHOULD NOT REMAIN. WE BELIEVE THAT KHAN'S  
REF B PROPOSAL MEETS THAT STANDARD, BUT THAT THE  
MINIMALIST GOR POSITION REPORTED REF A DOES NOT. END  
COMMENT. ALBRIGHT

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